Classics In Corporate Law And Economics Vol. 1 /
Macey, Jonathan
Classics In Corporate Law And Economics Vol. 1 / by Jonathan Macey - UK: Edward Elgar, 2008 - 689p. 24cm
Acknowledgements
Introduction
PARTY 1
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
1. R.H. Conse (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), November
2. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics
PART II THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
3. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1989), "The Corporate Contract, Columbia Law Review,
4. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1989), 'The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role', Columbia Law Review,
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1986), 'Close Corporations and Agency Costs', Stanford Law Review, 38, January,
PART III CORPORATE LAW FROM A COASEAN PERSPECTIVE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES, VOTING AND THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), 'Voting in Corporate Law', Journal of Law and Economics,
7. Jonathan R. Macey (1999), 'Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective', Cornell Law Review, 84, 1266-81
8. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), 'Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective', University of Toronto Law Journal,
PART IV CORPORATE LAWYERS AND OTHER 'INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES' OF CORPORATE LAW
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics,
9781845427542
Corporation law--Economic aspects
Law and economics
346.066 / MAC
Classics In Corporate Law And Economics Vol. 1 / by Jonathan Macey - UK: Edward Elgar, 2008 - 689p. 24cm
Acknowledgements
Introduction
PARTY 1
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
1. R.H. Conse (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), November
2. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics
PART II THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
3. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1989), "The Corporate Contract, Columbia Law Review,
4. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1989), 'The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role', Columbia Law Review,
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1986), 'Close Corporations and Agency Costs', Stanford Law Review, 38, January,
PART III CORPORATE LAW FROM A COASEAN PERSPECTIVE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES, VOTING AND THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), 'Voting in Corporate Law', Journal of Law and Economics,
7. Jonathan R. Macey (1999), 'Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective', Cornell Law Review, 84, 1266-81
8. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), 'Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective', University of Toronto Law Journal,
PART IV CORPORATE LAWYERS AND OTHER 'INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES' OF CORPORATE LAW
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics,
9781845427542
Corporation law--Economic aspects
Law and economics
346.066 / MAC