| Formatted contents note |
An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I<br/>PART I TAKEOVERS<br/>1. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110–20<br/>2. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’, Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April 1161–204<br/>3. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), ‘The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers’, Harvard Law Review, 95, 1028–56<br/>4. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1–4), April 5–50<br/>PART II INSIDER TRADING<br/>5. Henry G. Manne (1966), ‘In Defense of Insider Trading’, Harvard Business Review, 44, November–December, 113–22<br/>6. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’, Stanford Law Review, 35, May, 857–95<br/>7. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1986), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’, Northwestern University Law Review, 80 (6), 1449–72<br/>8. James D. Cox (1986), ‘Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”’, Duke Law Journal, 35 (4), September, 628–59<br/>9. Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom (1985), ‘Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders’, Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1), March, 71–100<br/>PART III BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE<br/>10. Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler and Yu Yuan (2012), ‘Global, Local, and Contagious Investor Sentiment’, Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (2), May, 272–87<br/>11. David Hirshleifer (2001), ‘Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing’, Journal of Finance, 56 (4), August 1533–97<br/>12. Robert J. Shiller (2003), ‘From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (1), Winter, 83–104<br/>13. Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard (2003), ‘Behavioral Economics and the SEC’, Stanford Law Review, 56 (1), October 1–73<br/>PART IV REGULATORY DESIGN<br/>14. Roberta Romano (1998), ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’, Yale Law Journal, 107, 2359–430<br/>15. Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney (1992), ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence’, University of Illinois Law Review, 1992, 691–740<br/>PART V THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS<br/>16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1991), ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’, Columbia Law Review, 91 (6), October 1277–368<br/>17. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock (2011), ‘The Insignificance of Proxy Access’, Virginia Law Review, 97, 1347–434<br/>18. Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black (2006), ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms’, Business Lawyer, 61 (3), May 1011–70<br/>PART VI COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE<br/>19. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2006), ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, Journal of Finance, 61 (1), February 1–32<br/>Index |
