| Formatted contents note |
Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller<br/>PART I THE NATURE OF THE BANKING FIRM<br/>1. George J. Benston (2004), ‘What’s Special About Banks?’, Financial Review, 39 (1), February, 13–33<br/>2. Martin Hellwig (1998), ‘Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (1), March, 328–45<br/>3. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy C. Stein (2002), ‘Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking’, Journal of Finance, 57 (1), February, 33–73<br/>4. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2001), ‘Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking’, Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2), April, 287–327<br/>PART II SHADOW BANKS<br/>5. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2010), ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 41 (2), Fall, 261–312<br/>6. Morgan Ricks (2012), ‘A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 (5), October, 1289–360<br/>PART III LIQUIDITY<br/>7. Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn (1991), ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements’, American Economic Review, 81 (3), June, 497–513<br/>8. Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi (1990), ‘Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation’, Journal of Finance, 45 (1), March, 49–71<br/>PART IV LENDING<br/>9. Gary Gorton and James Kahn (2000), ‘The Design of Bank Loan Contracts’, Review of Financial Studies, 13 (2), April, 331–64<br/>10. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’, Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (2), June, 117–61<br/>11. Douglas W. Diamond (1984), ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3), July, 393–414<br/>12. Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero (1997), ‘The Theory of Financial Intermediation’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21 (11–12), December, 1461–85<br/>PART V CAPITAL<br/>13. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2000), ‘A Theory of Bank Capital’, Journal of Finance, 55 (6), December, 2431–65<br/>14. Berry K. Wilson and Edward J. Kane (1996), ‘The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders’, NBER Working Paper No. 5848, December, i, 2–24, notes<br/>15. Benjamin C. Esty (1998), ‘The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking’, Journal of Financial Economics, 47 (2), February, 189–218<br/>16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2011), ‘Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight’, Columbia Law Review, 111 (4), May, 795–847<br/>17. Patrick Bolton and Frédéric Samama (2012), ‘Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert’, Economic Policy, 27 (70), April, 277–317<br/>18. Charles W. Calomiris and Richard J. Herring (2013), ‘How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25 (2), Spring, 39–62<br/>PART VI BANK RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK<br/>19. Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3), June, 401–19<br/>20. Charles W. Calomiris (1990), ‘Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic History, 50 (2), June, 283–95<br/>Index |
