Part I : The Institutional Regime of Interpretation
Chapter 1. Law Making Roles of the Legilature and the Judiciary
Chapter 2. Relation between the Executive and the Legislature
Chapter 3. The Relationship Between the Judiciary and the Executive
Part II : Techniques, Tools and Rules of interpretation
Chapter 4. Presumptions
Chapter 5. Statute and its Parts
Chapter 6. Rules of Interpretation
Chapter 7. Internal Aids
Chapter 8. Mandatory and Directory Provisions
Chapter 9. Retrospective Operation of Statutes
Chapter 10. Maxims used to aid Interpretation
Chapter 11. External Aids to Interpretation
Chapter 12. Repeal and Savings
Part III : The Contextual Dimensaion on Interpretation
Chapter 13. Interpretation of the Constitution
Chapter 14. General and Special Statutes
Chapter 15. Substantive and Procedural Laws, Amending, Codifying,
Consolidating and Enabling Statutes
Chapter 16. Beneficial and Welfare Statutes
Chapter 17. Interpretation of Expropriating, Emergency, and Penal Statutes
Chapter 18. Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes
Part IV : Precedents and Interpretation
Chapter 19. Precedents and Interpretation
Appendix – The General Clauses Act, 1897
Index

The landmark decisions in this edition assert a power to interpret the Constitution which moves beyond the text; even as the practice of expressing deference to legislative intention continues. The apex court has most openly embarked on the path of explicit lawmaking with all the attendant dangers of constitutional confrontation and discord. I refer here to the judgements on the constitutionality of the National Judaical Appointments Commission Act and the dismissal of the Arunachal Pradesh Government.
In the former decision, the Court struck down the NJAC legislation on the reasoning that the so called eminent persons in the Judicial Commission could turn down the recommendations of the Chief Justice and his brethren on Commission, a consequence which was not in accord with the constitutional Commitment to independence of judiciary-a principle, which according to the Supreme Court should only come in to play whilst regulating the relations between the executive and the Judiciary. The majority on the bench seemed to accord little importance to the principle in overseeing the relations within the Judiciary. Justice Chelameshwar in his dissent alludes to this fact when he refers to the absence of transparency in the proceeding of the collegium.