Chapter I. Literal Interpretation,
Chapter II. External Circumstances, Context And Acts In Pari Ma-Teria,
Chapter III. Title, Marginal Notes, Punctuation, Preamble, Schedule,
Chapter IV. Presumptions Arising From Subject Matter, And Object Of Enactments As To Language Used,
Chapter V. Presumptions Arising From Scope And Specific Purpose Of Act, And As To Evasion And Abuse Of Power,
Chapter VI. Presumptions As To Jurisdiction, Government, Excess Of Legislative Functions And Powers, Violation Of In-Territorial Law, Treaties And Constitution,
Chapter VII. Presumption Against Inconsistency. Repeal By Implication,
Chapter VIII. Presumption Against Repeal By Implication. General, Special And Penal Acts:
Chapter IX. Presumption Against Unreason, Inconvenience, Injustice And Absurdity,
Chapter X. Presumption Against Construction Permitting Impairing Of Contracts, Advantage From Own Wrong, And Re-Trospective Operation,
Chapter XI. Exceptional Construction To Effectuate Legislative Intent
Chapter XII.Strict Construction,
Chapter XIII. Usage and Contemporaneous Construction. Legislative Construction. Change Of Language
Chapter XIV. Associated Words,
Chapter XV. Implications and Intentions. Directory and Imperative Provisions. Impossibilities.
Ties. Waiver,
Chapter XVI. Effect Of Statute Upon Contracts Made In Contraven-Tion Thereof. Public And Private Implied Remedies,
Chapter XVII. Repeal. Commencement. Judicial Notice,
Chapter XVIII. Analogies And Differences Between The Construction Of Statutes And That Of Constitutions

Since its first publication in 1875, the treatise of Judge Maxwell, "On the Interpretation of Statutes," has deservedly taken high rank in England among the acknowledged authorities upon this branch of the law and has made its way to judicial recognition in this country. Its simplicity and practical directness in the treatment of an intricate and seemingly abstruse subject would, if there were nothing else to commend the work, distinguish it as one of preeminent usefulness to the profession.
The volume herewith submitted is founded upon and embodies the larger portion of that treatise. My original undertaking, indeed, was merely that of an American editor of the English work. While engaged upon that duty, I found the mass of new matter to be incorporated so great and so important to the American lawyer that its relegation to footnotes appeared impracticable. On the other hand, I ascertained that much in the work of the learned English jurist was inapplicable to the law of this country; that many essentials in the understanding and application, under our system, of the principles of statutory interpretation were neither recognized nor alluded to in his work, because alien to the English jurisprudence; and that certain changes of arrangement might be made with advantage to the American reader. To have interwoven with the original text this mass of new matter, often of a character entirely foreign to anything contemplated by the author; to have omitted portions of his work, no doubt by him regarded as material; to have changed his arrangement, the divisions of his book, and the titles he had given them, and still to have called it his work, would have been a wrong to him and to me.
The only proper course, it seemed, was to make a new book, which should declare itself to be founded and built upon Judge Maxwell's treatise, in which full credit should be prominently given for all that is derived from it but which should cast no apparent responsibility upon him for any changes, omissions, or additions.