Content
Volume I.
Acknowledgements
Introduction
PARTY 1
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
1. R.H. Conse (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm,' Economica, 4 (16), November
2. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics
PART II THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
3. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1989), "The Corporate Contract, Columbia Law Review,
4. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1989), 'The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role,' Columbia Law Review,
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1986), 'Close Corporations and Agency Costs,' Stanford Law Review, 38, January,
PART III CORPORATE LAW FROM A COASEAN PERSPECTIVE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES, VOTING AND THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS AND OTHER CONSTITUENCIES
6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), 'Voting in Corporate Law,' Journal of Law and Economics,
7. Jonathan R. Macey (1999), 'Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective,' Cornell Law Review, 84, 1266-81
8. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), 'Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective,' University of Toronto Law Journal,
PART IV CORPORATE LAWYERS AND OTHER 'INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES' OF CORPORATE LAW
9. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,' Journal of Law and Economics,

Volume II
Acknowledgements
An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I INSIDER TRADING
1. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’
2. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’
3. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), ‘Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation’
PART II THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
4. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’
5. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’
6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2002), ‘The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’
7. Richard Roll (1986), ‘The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers’
8. Ronald J. Gilson (1982), ‘Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense,’ Stanford Law Review, 35, November, 51-67 [17]
9. Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), ‘A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail’
PART III JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
10. Ralph K. Winter, Jr. (1977), ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation’
11. Roberta Romano (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’
12. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1987), ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law’
13. William J. Carney (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’
PART IV POLITICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW
14. John Pound (1993), ‘The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’
15. Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2004), ‘Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis’
16. Mark J. Roe (1991), ‘A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance’
Name Index