Economics of securities law, Vol.2/
by Geoffrey Miller
- UK: Edward Elgar, 2016.
- viii,848p.; 25cm.
- Economic Approaches to Law series .
An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I PART I TAKEOVERS 1. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110–20 2. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’, Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April 1161–204 3. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), ‘The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers’, Harvard Law Review, 95, 1028–56 4. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1–4), April 5–50 PART II INSIDER TRADING 5. Henry G. Manne (1966), ‘In Defense of Insider Trading’, Harvard Business Review, 44, November–December, 113–22 6. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), ‘The Regulation of Insider Trading’, Stanford Law Review, 35, May, 857–95 7. David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1986), ‘A Coasian Model of Insider Trading’, Northwestern University Law Review, 80 (6), 1449–72 8. James D. Cox (1986), ‘Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”’, Duke Law Journal, 35 (4), September, 628–59 9. Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom (1985), ‘Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders’, Journal of Financial Economics, 14 (1), March, 71–100 PART III BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 10. Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler and Yu Yuan (2012), ‘Global, Local, and Contagious Investor Sentiment’, Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (2), May, 272–87 11. David Hirshleifer (2001), ‘Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing’, Journal of Finance, 56 (4), August 1533–97 12. Robert J. Shiller (2003), ‘From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (1), Winter, 83–104 13. Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard (2003), ‘Behavioral Economics and the SEC’, Stanford Law Review, 56 (1), October 1–73 PART IV REGULATORY DESIGN 14. Roberta Romano (1998), ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’, Yale Law Journal, 107, 2359–430 15. Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney (1992), ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence’, University of Illinois Law Review, 1992, 691–740 PART V THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS 16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1991), ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’, Columbia Law Review, 91 (6), October 1277–368 17. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock (2011), ‘The Insignificance of Proxy Access’, Virginia Law Review, 97, 1347–434 18. Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black (2006), ‘Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms’, Business Lawyer, 61 (3), May 1011–70 PART VI COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2006), ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, Journal of Finance, 61 (1), February 1–32 Index
Bringing together the most important articles from leading authors in the field, Professor Geoffrey P. Miller’s new collection, Economics of Securities Law, is an essential resource for students, policy-makers, and those interested in the history and current status of the subject. The papers included represent fundamental contributions that shaped later thinking, illustrate approaches that have proven durably influential, or represent important challenges to conventional views. The collection also explores new approaches, such as behavioral economics, alongside ‘Chicago School’ papers, comparative analyses, and influential works by people involved in the creation of laws governing modern securities markets. ---provided by publisher